An Important Clarification on the Philippines' New Maritime Laws

The Philippine government has recently enacted two (2) pieces of legislation, of which it encompasses the country's maritime domain and its provisions, and with the details of each enacted laws come as a separate discussion on this website upon its official release on key government channels.

However, several people in one social media outlet handled by our entity aired their misguided sentiments, of which most of these people originated from across Southeast Asia. This piece gives the aim to provide the additional context and important information relating to the functions of the laws, in relation to the stipulations of the international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS.

THE ENACTMENT OF MARITIME LAWS

The new maritime laws aim to solidify Philippines' claims on its Exclusive Economic Zone, putting it within the scope according to the guidelines under international law.
(c) Spratly Islands - Kalayaan Tourism, via Image Source.

Last November 8, 2024, Philippine President Ferdinand R Marcos Jr has signed two (2) very important pieces of legislation relating to the country's maritime domain, namely the Republic Act (RA) 12064 or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and RA 12065 or the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act. Both of which give essential provisions that govern the enforcement and coverage of the Philippine maritime domain, and also providing the guidelines for sea lanes.

Specifically, the Republic Act 12064 or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act enforces the country's maritime domain in accordance to the standards set by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS, comprehensively define the geographic coverage of the Philippine maritime domain and the legalistic mechanisms for the government to enforce the Philippine law on the areas encompassed within this said comprehensive coverage.

This said law also enforces of putting and recognizing the name "West Philippine Sea" into law, further binding the Philippine claims within its 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone for its western seaboard, specifically the areas encompassing the Kalayaan Island Group or KIG and the Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc. With this emphasis on maritime jurisdiction, it aims to further ensure the rights of the Philippines as a maritime country, providing Filipinos with the right to enjoy its resources.

In the second law enacted on the same day, the Republic Act 12065 or the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, it emphasizes the definition of providing the country's territorial and exclusive economic zone waters that serve as 'maritime sea lanes' that foreign vessels can trespass within the country's jurisdiction, with provisions also apply on the country's air routes. There are at least three (3) sea lanes specified under this law, whereby vessels can pass to and from the West Philippine Sea through Celebes and (East) Philippine Seas.

Specifically, the sea lanes provided according to the Republic Act 12065 goes as follows - the first one traverses from the (East) Philippine Sea to the West Philippine Sea through the Balintang Channel between the Batanes and Babuyan Islands. The second one traverses from the Celebes Sea to the West Philippine Sea through the Sibutu Passage, Sulu Sea, Cuyo East Pass, and Mindoro Strait. Finally, the third one traverses once again from the Celebes Sea to the West Philippines Sea, this time via Basilan Strait, Nasubata Channel in Palawan's southern tip, Sulu Sea, and Balabac Channel.

The two (2) piece of legislation aims to provide clarity to the extent of the Philippine jurisdiction, while being affirmative to its maritime domain in accordance to the international law, specifically the ones provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS as the basis that enables this as a way that it has the full backing and compatibility to the policy and principles set by international legal bodies. As with other laws, it will come with its own Implementing Rules and Regulations that might take time to draft at the time of this writing.

As this development regarding the enactment of Philippine maritime domain laws takes time to get published on official government channels from the time this article publishes, the following detailed information aims to provide a primary approach in understanding the international laws and the mapping of the country's maritime domain, as it comes at attention lately that several Southeast Asian people are misleadingly outrageous on the reference map posted on one of our social media channels.

THE 2009 ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINES MAP

The 2009 Archipelagic Baselines Law map, as set by Republic Act 9522. NAMRIA will publish a new version under the new legislation.

On this November 8 post entry we made through X (formerly Twitter), it benignly captions the enactment of the Republic Act (RA) 12064 or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and RA 12065 or the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act into law by the Philippine President. Initially, this post meant to provide the necessary updated information that will probably dictate the country's policy on its national maritime domain, specifically the West Philippine Sea area, in the upcoming years. 

Unexpectedly, a horde of Malaysian and Indonesian social media users on the Elon Musk owned social media website attacked the post and misinterpret this post as 'encroachment', saying harsh words that the Philippines is following the footsteps either of the Chinese or the Israelis in "claiming" Northern parts of Indonesia and portions of Malaysia, even though that this is not the case, nor the intent made when publishing the map.

The emphasis points to the green line drawn in the map, saying that it is the Philippine 'claims' over Sabah, the northern part of Indonesia, and most of Taiwan, when in fact this only provides the theoretical line for the country's Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ if calculating the distance of 200 nautical miles from the nearest territorial baseline of the country. Apparently, the legends of the map also presented the median line (in purple) in both northern and southern parts of the country.

To clarify this up, and for the information of any Indonesian, Malaysian, our Filipino community readers in this medium, the map provides sufficient information on the jurisdiction and definition of the Philippine maritime domain during the time the map has crafted by National Mapping and Resource Information Authority or NAMRIA in 2009-2010, with the emphasis that the green line does not define Philippine territory, and more of its Exclusive Economic Zone (West Philippine Sea included), minus the overlapping domains with Taiwan on its north, and both Malaysia and Indonesia on its South. 

In fact, the Philippines' primary mapping agency will publish the new map of the Philippines' maritime domain that fully emphasizes the West Philippine Sea area, pending the completion and official publishing of the Maritime Domain Law's Implementing Rules and Regulations or IRR that serves as the RA 12064 or the Philippine Maritime Zone Act's primary guidelines for the agencies to adhere and follow, complementing the provisions presented by the law itself.

Hence, for any Indonesian or Malaysian citizen who went outraged from the post and is now reading this article, there really isn't need much of a worry as the Philippines does not intend to so-called 'claim' the areas within the 'green line' aside from the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone for its western and eastern seaboards, as it only serves as mapping reference that calculates the extent of the EEZ to the baseline. It might be better to understand the context of the maps first before reacting.

Now as the outrageous and senseless calls by misinformed citizens of neighboring Southeast Asian countries setting aside for the sake of this discussion, let there be some additional context on the country's archipelagic baselines, of which it will briefly delve on particularly on the discussion encompassing the Republic Act 9522 that is the basis of the map provided above, and some key notes provided in the UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal that nullifies China's claim.

REPUBLIC ACT 9522, UNCLOS, AND THE 2016 AWARD

The 2016 Arbitral Tribunal decision for the West Philippine Sea served as one of multiple bases for the recent enactment of the Philippine maritime laws.
Image Source.

When the map provided by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority or NAMRIA in 2009-2010, the Philippines did not experience any intensified aggressiveness from China's Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, and the People's Liberation Army Navy in asserting its so-called 'claims' in the West Philippine Sea, which have prompted the government of that time to submit its documentary references that support Philippines' right over Kalayaan Island Group and Panatag Shoal.

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at the Hague, the Netherlands, ultimately made a decision that nullifies China's nine-dash line in the West Philippine Sea and the greater South China Sea area, on the reference that it went beyond their supposedly Exclusive Economic Zone and that China's claims on historical grounds does not count as a reference under the 1983 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which they also ratified.

Added to this is the recent application of the Philippines over its extended continental shelf in the West Philippine Sea area before the United Nations, aiming to further cement the Philippines' undisputed jurisdiction over the areas like the Kalayaan Island Group, as it aims for the Philippines to have added legal basis for exploration and tapping on its maritime resources that the country will benefit economically. Of course, this does not stop countries like Vietnam from submitting their own version.

And, of course, the enactment of both the Republic Act (RA) 12064 or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and RA 12065 or the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act provides an additional reference for the government to get additional legal basis, grounded under international law, in asserting its rights over its Exclusive Economic Zone, particularly in the highly contested body of water named the West Philippine Sea where China illegally set up its artificial islands as power flexing.

Take note that all the emphasis on the enactment of the legalities and documentation are aiming against China's illegal claims in the West Philippine Sea area, of which this dismisses the erroneous perception on the previous map that, apparently, the Philippines also stake its claim in areas already part of Malaysia and Indonesia. In fact, this narrative only divides ASEAN unity even further that the only winner from this mess will be no other than - China.

Setting aside the overlapping areas that the Philippines will never likely to claim in this case, it is a clear resolve coming from the government to enact its laws that align more with the international law, as countries like the United States supports this move of the Philippine government, providing the needed mechanism for the agencies like the Philippine Coast Guard to enforce the Philippine laws in areas like the contested Kalayaan Island Group, being timely to its white hull acquisition spree.

As countries like the United States and Australia fully support the newly enacted maritime laws of the Philippines that cement further, not only it's legally grounded jurisdiction over the West Philippine Sea area like the Kalayaan Island Group and the Panatag Shoal, the next sub-topic of this discussion will cover the usual reaction of China on this law, along with some expected actions that attempts to counteract the well-recognized Philippine maritime laws.

CHINA AND MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENTS' REACTION ON THE MATTER

China’s so-called ‘claim’ in Panatag Shoal, Philippines.
Image Source.

As expected, the governments of both China and Malaysia will react to this newly enacted maritime domain laws of the Philippines, and will publicly denounce it as it runs contrary to its so-called ‘nine-dash line claims’ within the West Philippine Sea and the larger South China Sea area. In fact,the image provided above representing Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal with the imaginary baseline with Mandarin calligraphy written over it represents the larger neighbor’s attempt to respond to this situation.

The maritime law enactment resulted in China summoning the Philippine ambassador, conveying their full public protest as a show of full discontent by their government, as this goes preferable to the Philippines and the enacted laws' alignment to the standards set by the UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal decision, which the Chinese opt not to adhere on. Going as usual are their historical arguments over the Kalayaan Island Group and the Panatag Shoal, both of which have no bearing under the UNCLOS.

Given China's disregard to the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration that nullifies the so-called 'nine-dash line claim' of the regional neighbor and superpower, the country instead push for its claims through aggression and violence, both of which affects the livelihood of Filipino fisherfolk that relies on the areas for a bountiful fishing, while endangering the lives of both the Philippine Navy and Philippine Coast Guard personnel that both have the legal right to patrol the country's Exclusive Economic Zone.

Despite the criticisms pointed by China to the Philippines over its new maritime laws, it is good to see that the government stands firm on its resolve to highlight and clearly marking of its maritime domain, while ensuring the preservation of the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty, along with its right under the international law to enjoy sovereign rights for its Exclusive Economic Zone, especially in tapping and exploiting maritime resources that will benefit its citizenry for economic development.

After China, it is now the Malaysian government's turn to criticize the Philippines' new maritime law, especially that they claim that it once again touches Sabah, which actually is not the intention of the Philippine government as the emphasis is once again pointed out to the country's resolve of territorial integrity over areas contested like the West Philippine Sea. Hence, like the reaction on the Chinese criticism, the Philippine government will not budge on this protest.

This come as this Southeast Asian neighbor also appeal before the United Nations body to disregard the Philippine submission on the establishment of the country's continental shelf information for the West Philippine Sea area, using Sabah as an argument once again, even though it primarily points to the Philippines' resolve to preserve its Exclusive Economic Zone, especially in areas encompassed by both Kalayaan Island Group and Panatag Shoal.

As ASEAN unity is unattainable given this circumstance, and even pointing that the aforementioned Southeast Asian government simply rides on the Chinese narrative that undermine the enacted Philippine maritime laws that align to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS and the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration, it is at best interest for the Philippines to increase cooperation with its partnership with like-minded nations, and to improve its own defense posture.

ENDING NOTE

Clearer representation of the Philippine map.

The enactment of both the Republic Act (RA) 12064 or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and RA 12065 or the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act count as a significant development for the ensuring the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty, while safeguarding the citizenry's right to enjoy the maritime resources that are available in the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone waters, especially in terms of food security and the country's current energy demands.

This also aligns the country's domestic legislation and policy to the norms and standards stipulated and set by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS and the 2016 Permanent Rule of Arbitration, both serve as reference to nullify and invalidate the Chinese 'nine-dash line' claims over the West Philippine Sea and the larger South China Sea area. It also gives preference on the enforcement capabilities to the agencies like the Philippine Coast Guard.

It goes as timely as the Philippine Coast Guard embarks on a huge acquisition program of acquiring additional white hull vessels, forty (40) of which are smaller, thirty (30) meter vessels, and this also include the acquisition of at least five (5) additional Teresa Magbanua-class Multirole Response Vessels, all of which will help cement the country's presence in the country's Exclusive Economic Zone in the West Philippine Sea area. Add to this are offers from various shipbuilders for this endeavour.

Of course, the newly enacted Philippine laws for its maritime domain will expectedly receive some criticisms, especially involving the powers that wanted full dominion in the West Philippine Sea with its claims that are not aligned with the international law, or by some Southeast Asian neighbor that is insecure about its territorial sovereignty, even though the Philippines have its current legislation not aimed against overlapping domains, but to cement its territorial integrity according to international law.

The map presented above gives e clearer definition of the scope and coverage of the Philippine maritime domain, especially the areas that it considers its Exclusive Economic Zone, such as its western and eastern seaboard. It encompasses both the Kalayaan Island Group and Panatag Shoal, both of which are clearly within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone, and the Philippine (Benham) Rise in the east, of which this portion entitles to the Philippines' extended continental shelf.

As the Philippines affirms the passage of its maritime laws that has the backing of countries like the United States, this will only solidify the resolve of further solidifying its territorial integrity and national sovereignty even further, particularly when the Department of National Defense' Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept or CADC comes into play. This also goes with the country's desire to push added cooperation with like-minded allies and partners with this concept.

To end this note, this writeup gives an important clarification on the overview of the new maritime laws that the Philippines is pushing, although there will go a follow-up discussion on this matter upon delving deeper into both the Republic Act 12064 and 12065 through a separate entry. 

It will be nonsense to think that the Philippine government provokes neighbors into conflict through this legislation, especially given that it does not want war, but it will not back down, and it has an absolute right to preserve and defend its national territory that is rightfully part of the country.

(c) 2024 PDA.

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Japan's Ground-Based Air Defense Options to the Philippines

Bilateral defense relations between Japan and the Philippines come at an all-time high, signifying the continuous cooperation between both maritime nations that share a common adversary and similar situation regarding territorial domains and integrity in the Indo-Pacific region.

Coming alongside a comprehensive agreement between both countries also comes with a capacity-building package that provides much-needed benefits among both countries from a full defense point of view.

OVERVIEW

A missile launching unit of the Type 81 Missile Launcher of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.
Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

Bilateral agreements that involve national defense and security between countries are an interesting development in the affairs and the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region, whereby the benefits are sufficient for both of the security and defense requirements that both nations have. 

This is specifically the case between Japan and the Philippines, whereby both countries share a common adversary and situation in the region, one that involves challenges to each one’s territorial integrity.

Last July 8, 2024, both the Philippines and Japan signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement or RAA, whereby it has a bit similarity to the mechanisms imposed by the Visiting Forces Agreement or VFA between the Philippines and the United States of America. 

The reports described it as a ground-breaking development between the bilateral defense ties between both countries in the Indo-Pacific region, as both Japan and the Philippines are part of what geographically counts as the ‘first island chain’.

The agreement underscores the need of improved bilateral defense relation between both countries, of which it even comes to a point for Japan to support the Philippines on its capacity-building efforts under the ongoing push of the Revised AFP Modernization Program’s Re-Horizon 3 phase and the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept or CADC. In context, Japan’s first successful export of military hardware is with the Philippine Air Force’s J/FPS-3ME air surveillance radar and the J/TPS-P14ME mobile radar variant.

With the success of the export of the aforementioned radar systems to the Philippines from Japan, the latter is now raising up an idea of the likelihood of selling its surface-to-air missile batteries for the Philippine military to consider, with a wide variety of variants coming from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force that might find its way for the likes of the Philippine Air Force. This is especially in line with the recently passed New Government Procurement Act or NGPA (Republic Act 12009), allowing the purchase of second-hand military hardware, provided it is economically preferable to the government.

Currently, the ground-based air defense systems that the Armed Forces of the Philippines possess at the time this article primarily compose of the Spyder Philippine Air Defense System or SPADS of the Philippine Air Force, of which it is a Spyder MR variant provided by Rafael Systems Limited of Israel, and others like the man-portable air defense system or MANPADS that the Philippine Army has purchased for its limited air defense requirements. This comes aside from air defense systems the Philippine Navy has on its warships.

Meanwhile, there are many variants of air defense systems that are currently serving within the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, along with other platforms that it sets for decommissioning and likely getting discussed as a potential ‘up for grabs’ platform for the Philippine Armed Forces to consider. The other platforms already discussed on this website are the Type 74 tanks, the UH-1J Combat Utility Helicopters, and the AH-1S Attack Helicopters that the likes of the Philippine Army might consider.

This topic’s discussion will delve deep into the potential platforms that the Japan Ground Self Defense Force might get decommissioned and eventually transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, while covering at a glance regarding its development, capability, and other relevant details. 

Also, the scope of the Reciprocal Access Agreement gets briefly discussed in this article as a sub-topic, as it comes with relevance to the commitments Japan pushes in improving the Philippine Armed Forces capabilities building.

ABOUT THE RECIPROCAL ACCESS AGREEMENT OR RAA

Both the Philippine and Japanese governments reached an agreement that strengthening bilateral defense ties of both countries.
Image Source.

Both the Philippines and Japan sit lie in the first island chain between the Asian mainland and the Pacific Ocean, whereby both are island nations that share similar concerns and interest in the region, especially regarding national security concerns and in ensuring the stability and the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence, it is an ideal concept from here for both countries to strengthen bilateral defense and economic ties given the proximity between the two nations.

That ideal concept received a significant milestone on July 8, 2024, whereby both countries signed and agreed to the Philippine-Japanese Reciprocal Access Agreement or PH-JP RAA, whereby both countries can deploy and rotate military troops and military hardware on each territory and vice versa, encouraging the bilateral trainings and skills exchange between the Philippine military and its Japanese counterpart, of which this involves Humanitarian-related aid and disaster response exercises.

This comes as the Philippines have expanded its defense relations with like-minded countries, whereby similar arrangements that replicate the Reciprocal Access Agreement took place between the likes of Australia and Canada with their respective SOVFA or Status of Visiting Forces Agreement. It differs from the existing arrangement that the Philippines have with the United States and the jointly bound Visiting Forces Agreement or VFA, with itself being the enhancement of the Philippine-US alliance.

The agreement also set a precedent for the Japan Self Defense Force or JSDF to take part actively in any future bilateral and multilateral exercises within the country, especially with the likes of Joint Exercise Balikatan together with the United States, or in other activities that takes part within the Philippine territory. Likewise, this also enables troops belonging to the Philippine Armed Forces to take part in any exercises in Japan, strengthening interoperability and skills exchange between both forces.

Aside from Japan’s desire to join the annual Joint Exercise Balikatan that the Philippine Armed Forces and their United States Armed Forces counterparts taking part every year, the former also aims to craft and create its own version of the said joint exercise with the Philippines, a sign that there will be exercise that go beyond the usual humanitarian aid and disaster response scope before the agreement took place and goes to the scope that involves active military exercise and exchange between JSDF and AFP personnel.

With the approval of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between Japan and the Philippines, the ever-increasing bilateral defense cooperation between countries becomes likely expected, whereby aside from the exchange of both troops, skills, and subject between the troops of both the Japan Self-Defense Force and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, it also gives the likelihood for Japan’s increased support for the Revised AFP Modernization Program that has started when it exported air surveillance radars for the Air Force.

Now that the aspect of improving bilateral ties of both countries on both defense and diplomacy amidst the increased tensions on the peace and order in the Indo-Pacific region, the following subtopics will delve primarily on the existing air defense platforms that Japan Self Defense Force currently has that might have a likelihood or increased chance for their Philippine counterparts to consider, especially in augmenting the Israeli-made ground-based air defense system the latter currently operates.

JAPAN’S LICENSE-BUILT MIM-23 HAWK

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force still maintains the MIM-23 Hawk Surface-To-Air Missile, licensed-built in the country. 
Image retrieved from Wikimedia Commons.

The first air defense platform to delve under this topic involving Japan's Ground Based Air Defense Options that might provide for the Philippine military's capacity building for further securing its national airspace that is the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone or PADIZ, involves a licensed production copies of an American-based air defense missile design and feature, of which it comes as one of the main capacity features used during the Cold War as used by the United States and the Western Bloc.

Abbreviated as “Homing All the Way Killer”, MIM-23 HAWK is‌ an all-weather low to medium-altitude ground-to-air missile system developed and designed by the American Defense Company Raytheon to satisfy United States Army air defense requirements. 

First developed and produced in the 1950s, the iconic Cold-War era medium-range surface-to-air missile system still comes as an ideal supplementary platform for the Philippine Air Force’s ever-increasing air defense coverage requirements.

The first systems of this type entered active service into the United States Army service in the 1960s, followed by a memorandum of agreement across the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO that enabled the co-production of the system in Europe. 

This arrangement enabled countries like France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany to have the air defense system, followed by the succeeding orders to other European countries such as to Spain, Greece, and Denmark.

This 1950s-era medium-range air defense system played a significant role in key military combat in recent history, whereby it successfully helped Israel win the 1967 six-day war by shooting down several Egyptian fighter aircraft in several instances. It is also through this same year that the United States and Japan signed a memorandum of understanding or MOU, enabling the latter to produce licensed copy versions of the MIM-23 HAWK for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force use.

Aside from Israel, the Kuwaitis have also used its MIM-23 HAWK air defense system units against the Iraqi aircraft on the first days of the invasion from August 2, 1990, of which it became the iconic ‘Operation Desert Storm’, whereby coalition forces including the United States military deploy its troops and equipment to deter and fight the Iraqi invasion force. While the coalition force deployed their MIM-23 HAWK air defense system units in the Persian Gulf, it did not see actual combat operations.

There are at least three (3) variants of the MIM-23 HAWK medium-range air defense system as developed and improved by the US-based defense company Raytheon, of which it categorized into phases - Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III. 

The Phase I variant involves the replacement of key sensors and mechanisms onboard, while the Phase II and III variants introduce significant upgrades into its radar, electronics, and even introduced some advanced computer systems that increase its air defense intercept performance. 

Like any contemporary air defense systems like the Philippine Air Force’s Spyder Ground-Based Air Defense System, the MIM-23 HAWK operates as a single battery unit, comprising several launchers with a separate component for radar and control systems. 

Both systems mentioned provide substantiated air defense coverage across a certain area, with synchronous coordination from long range air surveillance radar platforms on fixed positions such as the J/FPS-3ME of Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric.

TYPE 81 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE

Another Type 81 air defense launch unit was on display. 
Image Source.

Another air defense system that the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force or the JGSDF fields that might have the likelihood to find its way into the Philippine military’s inventory is the Type 81 Surface-To-Air Missile platform. 

This system currently complements the MIM-24 HAWK medium-range air defense system in ensuring the securing the Japanese air defense identification zone, specifically that the country faces intrusions from its neighbors in recent years, starting from the former Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Unlike the MIM-24 HAWK, which is a medium-range air defense system, the Type 81 is actually a short-range air defense platform of which it also operates as a single battery unit, comprising a radar unit and at least two (2) launch vehicles, with the Isuzu SKW or officially known in JGSDF as the Type 73 heavy truck serving as the primary chassis of this air defense system. Both platforms, although having variances in air coverage and capabilities, are mainstay air defense platforms of the JGSDF.

While being a shorter range air defense system, the Type 81 is a system developed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, of which this is eventually getting introduced into active service within the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force or JGSDF in 1982. 

The missile munition that came with the system, of which it bears the name ‘Tan-SAM’, has three variants, whereby the original Tan-SAM 1 came with an infrared seeker, the Tan-SAM 1B has an improved infrared seeker, and the Tan-SAM 1C gets a phased array seeker.

Being a short-ranged air defense system, the Type 81 surface-to-air missile system’s own firepower has a maximum range of ten (10) kilometers and a maximum altitude of three (3) kilometers, or 9,842 feet. As for the later variant of the Tan-SAM missile, such as the 1C variant, that range has increased to fourteen (14) kilometers thanks to an improved rocket motor, coupled with a phased array seeking missile seeker that lessens the chance of getting jammed by an infrared decoy such as flares.

The Type 81 systems itself sought mass production from 1981 to the 1990s, while the Tan-SAM missile munitions that came with it still have continuous production since its introduction in the 1980s. 

This means that the Japanese company Toshiba, the one that oversees development and production of both the Type 81 systems and the Tan-SAM productions, took at least a decade for the production of the missile systems and still produces the munitions for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force requirements.

Once again, unlike the MIM-24 HAWK, the Type 81 surface-to-air missile system is indigenously Japanese, and is only owned by the Japan Ground Self-Defense force or JGSDF. 

Therefore, there are no other countries at the time of this writing, although any prospects of the Japanese government cooperating with the Philippine government in bolstering its air defense system might enable the latter to be the second user and the first overseas user of this air defense system in history.

Aside from these two older air defense platforms that the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force currently has in present and is likely on its way into decommission phase, there is also a likelihood that the Japanese might push its export of newer produced air defense system for the Philippine Air Force to consider, one of which is a significant improvement over the Type 81 surface-to-air missile system whereby it is also called the Tan-SAM KAI II variant.

TYPE 11 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE

This is basically an improvement over the Type 81 Surface-To-Air Missile.
Image Source.

While the first two types of air defense missile systems that might get by the Philippine Air Force after getting decommissioned from acting Japan Ground Self-Defense Force service after decades of continuous operations, the next two systems are the new ones that currently serve the Japanese military branch might also stand a chance into getting offered for the Philippines to have, although it is still at the discretion of the prospective end-user after considering financial and technical factors.

The first new air defense system for discussion is basically an improvement over the Type 81 Tan-SAM system as discussed here, whereby it shares the same capability as a short-ranged air defense system, while incorporating newer technology into the system, making it more capable compared to its predecessor. This refers to the Type 11 Surface-To-Air Missile, both of which share the same size of 160 mm caliber missile ammunition with its Type 81 predecessor.

Even though it shares a technological tree with the Type 81 surface-to-air missile, the Type 11 actually started development in 2005, with the first units delivered for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force use in 2014. 

Both platforms share the same launching platforms, such as the Isuzu SKW or the Type 73 heavy truck for its chassis, although smaller vehicles like the Toyota Mega Cruiser four (4)-wheeled drive heavy duty SUV can also serve as a launch platform of this short range air defense platform.

Developed by the Japanese technology firm Toshiba, the Type 11 missile specifications came with 2.93 meters long, 0.16 meter in diameter, and approximately 103 kilograms in weight. Going further, the system has a maximum range of eighteen (18) kilometers, which is basically greater compared to the fourteen (14) kilometer maximum range of its predecessor, the Type 81 surface-to-air missile system. The following details will refer to the composition of its system's battery platform.

Speaking of a Type 11 surface-to-air missile battery system, it comprises a single Fire Control System Vehicle and two launcher vehicles that can carry four (4) missiles each at a maximum, totalling at least eight (8) missiles per launching battery. 

Aside from those mentioned, the Type 11 launching unit also comes with support vehicles that will help rearm the launchers once all 8 missiles from two launching platforms get used against an aerial threat within the air defense system’s area of operations.

Sharing a similar attribute as an improved variant of the Type 81 surface-to-air missile, the Type 11 air defense platform will not be that far-fetched for the Japanese to provide this platform either as a separate offer to its predecessor, or as a package, depending on how things might go if this prospect pushes through. 

Still, the idea for the sale of such a platform to the Philippine Air Force is possible, given how the service branch secures the J/FPS-3ME radar platform that the Japan Self Defense Force currently uses.

The next air defense platform that Japan currently uses is more capable than both the Type 81 and Type 11 air defense systems, and this will also complete this prospective list of what will be for the country’s support for improving the Philippine Air Defense System, specifically through these ground-based air defense solutions that might go integrated into the larger system that effectively implements the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone or PADIZ.

TYPE 03 MEDIUM RANGE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE

Also known as the Chu-SAM, the Type 03 air defense system is Japan's most modern and more capable air defense system of greater range.
Image Source.

Completing the list is this capable and modern air defense system that the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force currently uses, as it is in tandem with the older MIM-23 Hawk air defense system that this Japanese military service branch is looking forward to decommissioning. 

Also, just like the short-ranged Type 11 surface-to-air missile platform, this one is a likely candidate for Japan’s support in improving the Philippines’ own air defense system platform, augmenting the air surveillance radars it supplied.

Designed to replace the older MIM-23 Hawk air defense system that the Japanese produced under license and operated by Japan Ground Self-Defense Force for decades, the Type 03 medium-range air defense system serve as the country’s first indigenously developed and produced air defense system, of which the development has undertaken by a partnership between the Japan Technical Research and Development Institute and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries or MHI.

The development of this indigenously produced Japanese medium-range air defense platform started in the 1990s until this step completed in 2003 that the manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, has started production of this air defense platform for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force requirements from 2005 onwards. 

Since then, there are sixteen (16) companies of Type 03 medium range air defense platform serving the JGSDF actively, with it being the only user of the platform at the time of this writing.

Moving on to the specifications and subsystems of the Type 03 medium range air defense system developed for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, its overall range comes at around 50 kilometers, with speeds going at the maximum of Mach 2.5 or twice and a half the speed of sound, and its maximum altitude of around 10 kilometers or 32,808.40 feet. This means that its capability comes at part with Israel’s SPYDER-MR variant of Air Defense Systems that the Philippine Air Force currently operates to-date.

Going further in talking about its specifications and performance, the Type 03 missile has the maximum speed of Mach 2.5 or two and a half times the speed of sound, while the sensors and components found on both the missile and the batteries that launched it comprise with an Active Radar Homing Seeker, plus Inertial Guidance and Mid-flight command link that is specifically designed to detect and deter threats such as intruding fighter aircraft, helicopters, and inbound cruise missiles.

Having a medium-range air defense system like the Type 03 platform plays a crucial role for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and its air defense prospects, especially when they deployed the air defense platform near the highly contested Senkaku Islands within the Okinawa Prefecture that Japan has full sovereignty on, while China claims the islands as its own in a manner similar to the sham claims that the rogue regional superpower has in claiming Philippines’ Kalayaan Island Group and Panatag Shoal.

If the Japanese actually ended up providing each of the air defense systems like the Type 03 air defense system for the Philippines to use, this will dramatically give a sign of improved defense relations between both countries, particularly in ensuring a secured airspace in the Indo-Pacific region as both Japan and the Philippines help ensures a secured and stable Indo-Pacific region, particularly in monitoring and keeping each other’s airspace in check against unwanted intruders.

IN CONCLUSION

The Japanese air defense systems will help augment the capabilities of the Israeli-made SPYDER-MR Ground Based Air Defense Systems or GBADS.
Image Source @AlfredoGenom.

The recent development in Philippine-Japanese bilateral defense relations signals an improved cooperation between both countries regarding national defense and security, particularly that the Reciprocal Access Agreement that has agreed by both sides enabled the militaries of two countries to take part in the exercises of one another, while freely taking part in deployment of troops within territorial jurisdiction of both Japan and the Philippines within the scope of this bilateral agreement.

This development gets a symbolic emphasis on deeper bilateral defense cooperation between both countries, as Japan might grant the request of the Philippines for selling its air defense system solutions, both the ones that are about to retire and the ones that are still in active service in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, likely produced as a brand new platform solution in a manner similar to the new fixed and mobile radar solutions that the Philippine Air Force receives.

Shall this push through, it will significantly improve the country's air defense system mechanism even further, especially that this will probably get reinforced even more with the Philippine Air Force's desire to secure its own multi-role fighter aircraft, now getting additional candidates than ever such as France's Dassault Rafale F4 fighter aircraft. This come as both air and naval defense go as an essential component to secure the country's own archipelagic geography against external threats.

Recalling once again, there are at least four (4) types of Japanese air defense systems that might likely get its way into the Philippine military service, namely the Cold War-designed, license-built MIM-23 air defense system, Type 81 short-ranged air defense system, which is Japan's first indigenously built air defense solution for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, its successor the Type 11 air defense system, and the medium-range Type 03 air defense system.

For context, the Philippine Air Force currently has at least three (3) batteries of SPYDER Ground-Based Air Defense System from Israel's Rafael Advanced Systems Ltd, whereby its current number of systems unit does not suffice the air defense requirements for the operation of the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone, in a manner similar to how the Multi-role Fighter Aircraft and additional FA-50 light combat aircraft being a priority project for the country's air service branch.

Both the radar platforms and the prospect air defense systems come as the beginning of the growing defense cooperation between Japan and the Philippines, both facing challenges from a larger, aggressive neighbor in the Indo-Pacific region that uses violence in a manner to assert its so-called "claims" over islands in both East and South China (West Philippine) Seas, which is not surprising that both countries are like-minded in dealing with this scenario.

Ultimately, this development will eventually help improve the interoperability and exchange of necessary skills and technological know-how, especially in improving capabilities and employing it for the benefit of improving the defense of both countries in the long run. This comes as both countries belong to the First Island Chain, a set of geographically positioned areas that either keep a regional neighbor like China at bay, or to have a dominated access in the Western Pacific area.

(c) 2024 PDA.

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