Discussing the Philippine Army's Additional 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (PGM Ready) Project

As the other service branches of the Philippine Armed Forces expand their capabilities, such as in the case for the Philippine Navy's additional naval vessels and the Philippine Air Force's never-ending pursuit in securing its comprehensive multi-role fighter jet package, the Philippine Army continues to expand its existing capability, with this one revolving around the increase of its self-propelled howitzers in service.

AS REPORTED IN THE 2025 DND PROCUREMENT MONITORING REPORT (PMR)

The Ceasar MKII self-propelled howitzer from KNDS (formerly Nexter) is among the likely candidates of the Philippine Army's additional self-propelled howitzer project.
Image gathered from the KNDS website.

On the previous two (2) projects discussed regarding the additional Miguel Malvar-class frigate and additional anti-submarine warfare helicopters of the Philippine Navy, its primary source of information originated from the same report presented on the transparency section of the Department of National Defense’s own website for the 2nd half of 2025, as this is always a routine among government agencies to post their respective procurement monitoring reports, done by semesters within a fiscal year.

Still on that same report, the Department of National Defense presented a single acquisition project intended for the Philippine Army, one that will help increase the number of self-propelled howitzers active within the service branch. 

Currently, the Philippine Army maintains at least twelve (12) ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzers made by the Israeli firm Elbit Systems, the same manufacturer that provides military hardware to the service branch, such as the Sabrah light tank.

The interest in the Philippine Army’s self-propelled howitzer platform speaks volumes for its satisfactory performance as used by the service branch’s artillery personnel in terms of its field use, as its shoot and scoot feature gives quicker response time for the troops to provide artillery support on the ground at a shortest time possible, while reducing the risk for the personnel in getting caught from a counterattack, as the platform can get pulled out from its area of concern.

While getting a platform from the same source is an excellent way to go in terms of logistical aspects of operating and maintaining it, other factors are at play that might prompt the planners at the high level to consider other candidates that will help complement the capability and key features for a self-propelled howitzer. This point of concern comes as the discussions on this topic will delve deep into the path this acquisition project will proceed.

Aside from the logistical concerns involving the supplier of the ATMOS 2000 to the Philippine Army, part of the discussion will also cover the preferable candidates for the additional orders made for a self-propelled howitzer platform, whereby multiple references will provide the likely preferable one that the planners of the service branch to consider, as this will help factor in the satisfiable end-user requirements relative to the overall thrust of the service branch under the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

'NOT A REPEAT ORDER OF THE ATMOS 2000 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER'

The Philippine Army maintains at least twelve (12) total ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer pieces.
Image (c) Army Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army (via Wikimedia Commons)

From a logistical point of view, the purchase of additional self-propelled howitzer units for the Philippine Army will give more sense, especially if this project comes with the order of additional ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer units from Israel’s Elbit Advanced Systems, especially that the service branch already has this type in inventory, and the personnel already having the experience on gaining needed skills relative to its operational, maintenance, and repair requirements.

However, the ongoing situation in the Middle East, which stemmed out from a 2023 conflict that involves the country of Israel itself against the aggression waged by a Palestinian-based group named Hamas, makes the supply chain situation worse, whereby the Israeli defense industrial production takes its country’s military supply needs first before exported products, which affects any prospect that the Philippine Military has in securing Israeli-made weapons like the ATMOS 2000 SPH.

This only got further exacerbated by the silent policy shift from the Philippine government in avoiding established Israeli suppliers like Elbit and Rafael Advanced Systems inexplicably, where the other factor, aside from the supply chain stretch that came as the result of the ongoing conflict that the country has with Hamas, points to the Israeli government’s lack of support to the Philippines’ sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea, especially on both the Kalayaan Island Group and Panatag Shoal.

The backlog that came as the result from the increase in demand for Israeli-made military hardware, especially by the Israeli Defense Force itself, coupled with the not-so-warm reception from the Israeli government in supporting the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea, makes any future military deals with Israeli-based companies a bit of undesirable for the Philippine Armed Forces to consider, likely resulting for the Philippine government through the Department of National Defense to seek other supplier options.

With this primary basis coming into consideration, the Philippine Army’s additional self-propelled howitzer program is now open for other prospective military suppliers to take part in the project. 

With this new procurement deal that will probably not be a repeat order of ATMOS 2000 that is already in service within the service branch, this paves the way for interesting self-propelled howitzer designs that will probably have its way into the hands of the country’s troops, providing artillery support in the battlefield.

THE NEW CANDIDATES OF THE PROJECT

One of the self-propelled howitzer platforms included in the shortlist is the Excalibur Army's DITA 155mm artillery platform.
Image Source.

With the idea of just buying additional ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer out of the picture, this paves the way for the Philippine Army into seeking different platforms that will complement the Israeli-made artillery pieces already in service, in a manner that it comes with the same performance that the end-user seeks for a self-propelled howitzer, while securing the assurance of timely delivery and an unhampered supply chain that is not affected by any military affairs its host country undertake.

There are at least two (2) platforms that are in the shortlist of what will be the next self-propelled howitzer of the Philippine Army, after Israel’s shortcomings in both the diplomatic and material support front as the Department of National Defense’s desire in improving its materials supply chain limiting to like-minded partners that support the government’s official stance in the West Philippine Sea. These are the Czech-made DITA 155mm SPH and the French-made KNDS CAESAR SPH.

Do take note that while both of the platforms aforementioned are in the shortlist by the Department of National Defense as reported, the details might still change from the time this article publishes as negotiations and the entire procurement process itself is ongoing, with changes on the shortlist might even happen and likely getting narrowed down to the preferred platform by the Philippine Army as the end-user. In this topic, the shortlist will cover the said two platforms, all for the sake of this discussion.

The DITA 155mm self-propelled howitzer is a Czech-made artillery product made by Excalibur Army, the same entity that should have supplied the Pandur II 8x8 armored vehicle chassis for the wheeled variant of the Sabrah Tank under the Philippine Army’s Light Tank Acquisition Project. As marketed, it sports a 155mm NATO caliber barrel, capable of firing artillery rounds of this size while having a maximum firing range of around thirty-nine (39) kilometers.

Compared to the ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer that the Philippine Army currently has in its inventory, the Excalibur DITA has the advantage with its automatic gun aiming along with its armored, air-conditioned cab with a filtration unit. The howitzer cannon of this platform acts as a gun turret, effectively providing artillery support at a wider angle while coming with an onboard guiding system that gives helpful analytics for an effective fire effect results of the Czech-made artillery piece’s salvo.

Such technological advancement for a self-propelled howitzer will be new for the Philippine Army’s personnel if it gets chosen, as this complicates the skills needed to operate, maintain, and overhaul this artillery throughout its service life, with the learning curve going steeper for the personnel who have the skills and experience operating and maintaining the current ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer currently active within the Philippine Army service.

This leaves the second shortlisted platform to be likely the preferable platform that the leadership within the Philippine Army and the Department of National Defense to consider, as the French-made self-propelled howitzer shared most of the operational and maintenance principles to the Israeli-made system where the steep learning curve will probably lessen as familiarity between the ATMOS 2000 and this system will help the service branch in considering this platform.

THE CLOSEST ONE TO THE ATMOS 2000 HOWITZER SETUP

The KNDS CAESAR self-propelled howitzer is one of the shortlisted candidates of the Philippine Army's self-propelled howitzer acquisition project.
Image Source.

The said competitor to the Excalibur Army’s DITA 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer solution is the KNDS CAESAR SPH, in which it is basically similar to the ATMOS 2000 in terms of its artillery configuration, with the howitzer basically fitted on a truck chassis and the ending tip of the artillery aimed to the front of the unit rather than the rotating turret configuration that came with the Czech-made self-propelled howitzer. This configuration gives it an advantage in terms of operational skills and experience-based familiarity.

Like both the DITA 155mm SPH and the ATMOS 2000, the KNDS CAESAR SPH also comes with a 155mm barrel, basically sharing munitions standards across the said platforms that ensures the interoperability of each system in firing the standard 155mm/52 caliber ordnance. The said standardized caliber ordnance for artillery rounds counts as a NATO standard that countries like the Philippines usually follow relative to the firearm calibers used by the armed forces, such as the 5.56mm NATO ammunition standard.

Developed in the 1990s by KNDS predecessor GIAT (Groupement des Industries de l'Armée de Terre) at the time it was a defense entity fully controlled by the French government, the CAESAR self-propelled howitzer has since then become widely used by multiple militaries across the world, which included the French armed forces itself. In Southeast Asia, the operators of this self-propelled howitzer include the countries of Thailand and Indonesia, with the former also possessing the Israeli-made ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer.

This means that for the Philippines, having the KNDS CAESAR self-propelled howitzer helps not only on a smoother and less steep learning curve for the Philippine Army personnel who have the experience in operating and maintaining the ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer from Israel’s Elbit Systems, but also having the benefit of an abundant source of spare parts resource with its number of users, lessening the stress on the country’s logistical chain for maintenance and overhaul purposes.

With its similarity in mind, there are chances that the Philippine Army will consider the French-made self-propelled howitzer system for its expanded capability use for this specialized type of artillery fitted on a vehicle for shoot and scoot operations, although the DITA 155mm self-propelled howitzer solution made by Excalibur Army comes with its own advantage, as its howitzer turret mount comes as a capability plus that expands its circular target area radius as compared to the competition.

IN SUMMARY

Any of the two (2) preferred self-propelled howitzers will complement the current ATMOS 2000 in service.
Image (c) Army Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army (via Wikimedia Commons)

The Philippine Army’s acquisition plan regarding the additional 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (PGM Ready) Project is simply one part of the service branch’s ongoing efforts into expanding its firepower capability, which coincides with the wider push by the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines to further modernize its capabilities that align to territorial defense posture. This acquisition project entails the organization’s enhancement of coastal-based defense bombardment capability.

Currently, the said service branch possesses at least twelve (12) units of the ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer pieces from Israel’s Elbit Systems Ltd, until a government policy makes the prospect of buying additional units of this type of self-propelled howitzer a less-preferable choice to take. Hence, the tender for this project is now open for other prospective suppliers to secure the contract, hoping that the winning supplier will take a piece of the country’s national defense market.

This push, with the Israel-made self-propelled howitzer now out of the picture, enabled the Philippine Army to get this project with two (2) shortlisted candidates that might get its way into the service branch’s inventory, which as the Excalibur Army DITA 155mm self-propelled howitzer from Czechia, versus the KNDS CAESAR 155mm self-propelled howitzer from France. Each of the presented offers came with its advantages and disadvantages that might entice the end-user to consider each offer.

In terms of interoperability and having a flatter learning curve for existing ATMOS 2000 crew, the French KNDS CAESAR 155mm self-propelled howitzer presented itself at this advantage, as it shares similar artillery fitting design to the Israeli-made one that the Philippine Army currently operates, hastening the integration process for the platform should the end-user choose it as its preferable platform. Meanwhile, the turreted howitzer solution of the DITA 155mm is a marketed feature for Excalibur Army.

Ultimately, the Philippine Army will expand its self-propelled howitzer capability in terms of numbers fielded and overall firepower projection regardless of which platform gets chosen, as this supports the expanded capability of the service branch relative to its mandated duties and responsibilities in ensuring the preservation of the country’s sovereignty and freedom of its populace, all of which are important push for the security and defense of the entire republic from both domestic and foreign threats. 

(c) 2026 PDA.

Published from a station in Eastern Visayas. 

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Philippine Defense Budget in 2026 as Explained

The Philippine government enacted the 2026 General Appropriations Act, which includes portions of the country's defense budget for the said year. As always, the figures presented for the defense budget in this calendar year as compared to previous years will come as a presentation of the current trends that also correlate to the urgency of the country's overall policy for its national security, especially with the challenges that external forces pose against the territorial integrity of the Filipino Nation.

OVERVIEW

The 2026 General Appropriations Act funds all projects of the government for the said year.
That includes the ones under the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

On January 5, 2026, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.‌ signed Republic Act 12314, more commonly known by many as the 2026 General Appropriations Act, into law. This enacted law, at a glance, defines the allotments provided by the national government through the recommendations set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) after collating the plans and programs presented by various agencies, which then undertook budget deliberations at the legislative level before it got the presidential signature.

Amounting to Php 6.793 trillion, the law provides authorization to all government agencies and instrumentalities to use the budget according to their set plans and programs as defined by their various annual procurement plans or APP, as governed by respective procurement, accounting, and auditing rules and regulations set at the time this article got published, especially the recently enacted Republic Act 12009 or the New Government Procurement Act (NGPA).

As the law now takes its course as being under implementation all throughout the year 2026 plus the subsequent continuing appropriations validity of the 2026 General Appropriations Act extended to the year 2027 in terms of obligations for MOOE and Capital Outlay, giving an in-depth look on the allotments provided to the Department of National Defense, including those under the Revised AFP Modernization Program, provides a picture that entails changes and developments on the presented figures.

Of course, the defense budget deliberations also came with scrutiny, especially with calls within the halls of the legislative bodies relating to un-programmed appropriations, along with the calls of the Department of National Defense on provisions regarding to the flexible financing options that might enable them to undertake contracts and other deals that entail the expansion of the capabilities provided to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as aligned to the Republic Act 10349 or the Revised AFP Modernization Law.

For this topic, the discussion will not only cover the figures relating to the allotments provided to the Defense Department for the fiscal period of 2026, but also to cover other matters relating to the defense budget during the deliberation, the calls for minimizing the need of including un-programmed appropriations in the written legislature, and the hurdles entailing an old presidential decree which undermines a special provision in the law relating to the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

THE BREAKDOWN UNDER DND REGULAR APPROPRIATIONS

Here is the programmed budget intended for National Defense under the 2026 General Appropriations Act.
From Republic Act 12314.

In the provided figures above, referencing the 2026 General Appropriations Act encompassing the entire budgetary allotments that the Department of National Defense have for the said fiscal period, the total amount provided for the said department for the said year amounts to the total of Php 305.872 billion, of which Php 292.483 billion of the budget are intended to the financial requirements of the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines under this regular fund.

Going into the specifics, the Philippine Army received the largest portion of the budgetary pie of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with a total allotment of Php 145.161 billion, followed by the Philippine Air Force with a total budgetary allotment of Php 60.634 billion. 

The Philippine Navy received the smallest allotment among the three (3) major branches of the Philippine Armed Forces, with a budgetary allotment of Php 59.929 billion, and completing the amount is GHQ-AFP with Php 26.758 billion.

Other than the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the remaining budgetary allotments of the Department of National Defense go to other agencies attached to the department, including the Office of the Secretary itself. 

That includes self-reliance defense posture efforts of the ‌Government Arsenal (GA), disaster and calamity response units belonging to the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), military support institutions for career enhancement (NDCP), and veterans-related support.

As compared to the allotments provided by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to the Department of National Defense in 2025 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, there is a significant increase in allotment for the country’s military in 2026, in which the variance in comparison amounts to around Php 32,245,003,000.00, up from 2025’s Php 260.238 billion in allotment. Each of the major branches received an increase in its allotment, encompassing its entire Personnel Services, MOOE, and Capital Outlay expenditure items.

In the breakdown, each of the major service branches of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the General Headquarters, received an increase in allotment for 2026 that comes with the following amounts: Php 6,933,151,000.00 for the Philippine Army, Php 9,060,027,000.00 for the Philippine Air Force, Php 8,894,742,000.00 for the Philippine Navy, and Php 7,357,083,000.00 for the General Headquarters, AFP and AFP-Wide Service Support Units, totalling to the said Php 32.245 billion increase.

As always, the large portion of the budget of the major branches of the Philippine Armed Forces goes to the Personnel Services of its officers and troops, specifically for the salaries and benefits of its currently active personnel plus retirement benefits for those who already reached their mandatory age of exiting from active duty. 

The second largest allotment, as presented on the graph, goes to the maintenance and upkeep of both military hardware and facilities, and the remaining amount goes to their capital outlay projects.

In totality, the Armed Forces of the Philippines saw a significant increase on its allotments, sufficiently aligning to the ongoing sustainment of its personnel and operational requirements, along with its continuous effort of upgrading its facilities, buying capital outlay items that are not part of the Revised AFP Modernization Program, and its transformation to a more capable force aligned with its current posture pointing for external defense deterrence.

REVISED AFP MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

The amount set by the 2026 General Appropriations Act for the Revised AFP Modernization Program comes at around Php 40 billion.

For fiscal year 2026, the budget allotted for the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the General Appropriations Act of the said year is ‌around Php 40,000,000,000.00 - an increase compared to the 2025 allotment of Php 35,000,000,000.00 and similar to the allotment provided by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for this specific budgetary expenditure item for the year 2024. 

This clearly emphasizes the consistency provided in the amount allotted by ‌Congress for this program.

It is also at this consistency of the provided allotments for the Revised AFP Modernization Program that the Armed Forces of the Philippines found constrained into providing its multi-billion acquisition projects spanning all the three (3) major service branches of the organization, some of which are way beyond the fiscal space provided by the DBM such as the multi-role fighter jet package proposals pushed by the Department of National Defense for the Philippine Air Force.

While the amount provided increases by Php 5,000,000,000.00 compared to the figures provided under the 2025 General Appropriations Act, the overall allotment provided for the year 2026 still comes insufficient from this point of view, especially that there are still projects funded under multi-year arrangements that will probably use the funding under this allotment for the projects to push through. This gives the DND budget planners minimal fiscal space to move and select key programs under this arrangement.

For context, several projects pushed by the Department of National Defense based on their Procurement Monitoring Report encompassing the 2nd semester of year 2026 includes the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement (which calls for the purchase of two (2) additional Miguel Malvar-class frigate/HDF-3200 variant), six (6) anti-submarine warfare helicopters (likely the Leonardo AW-159 Wildcat), additional 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer of the Philippine Army, among others.

While the allotment for the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the 2026 General Appropriations Act remains constant, the overall budget for this object of expenditure actually increased significantly, especially when factoring in the next part of this discussion, this time encompassing the one categorized under Un-programmed Appropriations, itself faced with controversy at the period when the overall budget itself faced full scrutiny at the light of budget-related issues riddled in the year 2025.

UNPROGRAMMED APPROPRIATIONS

Most of the items under the Un-programmed Appropriations got slashed out as the result of the Presidential Veto, leaving the Revised AFP Modernization Program and Support to Foreign-Assisted Projects.

As complementary to the allotments provided for the Revised AFP Modernization Program, the 2026 General Appropriations Act also provided some additional fiscal space for the said item of expenditure through this important yet equally controversial feature of the enacted law - the Un-Programmed Appropriations allotment. 

As discussed previously on various topics on the defense budget, this provision can go into effect if any of the conditions provided for the un-programmed appropriations takes place.

For the Revised AFP Modernization Program, such allotment equates to around Php 50 billion, totalling the allotment that gets set aside for this program under the 2026 General Appropriations Act to around Php 90 billion - the highest allotment there is to-date since the time this article gets published. 

For context, the 2025 General Appropriations Act set aside around Php 75 billion for this expenditure item, while the 2024 General Appropriations Act only set aside Php 50 billion.

This is also the highest one provided under the Un-Programmed Appropriations allotment intended for the Revised AFP Modernization Program to-date, as it is higher by Php 10 billion compared to the 2025 General Appropriations Act’s Php 40 billion, and even higher further than the 2024 General Appropriations Act’s Php 10 billion. 

The increase gives emphasis that while the national government provides the needed budget for the item, its dependency on the government’s revenue performance does not give it full guarantee.

The uncertainty that this provision gives means a lot for any earmarked acquisition projects that the Department of National Defense has in line under the Revised AFP Modernization, aside from the other flexible financing scheme that is also highlighted on the special provisions of its budgetary use as it gets discussed separately on this article writeup. Any ‌progress aligned with the budget allotted under this current year's enactment is likely reflected in the semestral release of the DND’s procurement report.

Enacting the General Appropriations Act for 2026, especially the un-programmed appropriations act, doesn't always come smoothly, as the very core definition of this provision always comes riddled with its own sets of controversy. 

At one point, concerned groups highlighted the constitutionality of simply having the concept of un-programmed appropriations in the enacted law, further implying that any agency plans under these appropriations will fail if there is no available funding to cover them.

At the time this article is written, there is an ongoing deliberation of oral arguments relating to the constitutionality concerns of the un-programmed appropriations before the Supreme Court, as its critics highlight of its concerned legality that might affect the Php 50 billion allotments of the Revised AFP Modernization Program especially if there is a basis that there is a problem on its legality. The question on its decision, however, will probably happen at a time that is beyond what is now provided in this writeup.

While the question on un-programmed appropriations, where the large pie of the Revised AFP Modernization Program allotment, makes it uneasy on the overall implementation of key Acquisition Projects earmarked using this fund which might likely include the most sophisticated weaponry that either of the three major service branches of the organization aims to get, the next point of this discussion will cover another aspect of this topic - which on the special provisions relating various financing schemes.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE REVISED AFP MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

The provided special provisions highlighted the use of Foreign and Domestic Financing Requirements to fund big ticket acquisition projects under the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

In an itemized budget release, such as with the Revised AFP Modernization Program, it always comes with a special provision that is primarily intended for‌ guidance on how the budget will be released by the Department of Budget and Management to fund the modernization-related requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines earmarked in this object of expenditure, along with the reporting and posting requirements intended for accounting and auditing reasons as expected on a public office.

While the special provisions on both the release and reporting come as a regular case for the Revised AFP Modernization Program allotment item, this writeup in 2026 now includes something that might, as what several lawmakers pushed, help the planners within the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in their desire to secure far more sophisticated military weaponry and the expensive price tag that it comes with, especially when it is an entire force package.

This said special provision mentioned here refers to the ‘Foreign and Domestic Financing Arrangements’, which itself comes as a complementary mechanism to the allotments set aside for the Revised AFP Modernization Program, as the annual allotments provided by the national government are likely insufficient to other big ticket projects that are beyond the allotments provided on the enacted laws. One key example of a project that might require this arrangement is on a package involving multi-role fighter jets.

Detailing the arrangement as written in the special provisions of the law governing the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the 2026 General Appropriations Act, it says that the Secretary of Finance has the authority to negotiate, contract, and undertake into foreign and domestic financing schemes and arrangements, with consultation provided from the Department of National Defense, which then will undertake the approval directly from the President, with limitations as provided by law.

The ‘limitations as provided’ itself is one big stumbling block in attaining multiple large acquisition projects that go beyond what’s allowed in the budget, as there is another law written way back in the 1970s that explicitly limits the amount needed for the national government to secure a loan or any other credit and financing mechanisms in place. This specific law directly refers to Presidential Decree No. 415, which gives authority to the Secretary of National Defense to undertake defense contracts primarily focused on SRDP.

The provision on the Presidential Decree No. 415 that presents as a stumbling block into attaining better financing schemes lie on Section 3 of the said decree, whereby the President of the Philippines has the power to contract various financing mechanisms not limited to loans and credit lines, of which it should not exceed the amount of around Three Hundred Million United States dollars (US$300 million), of which only equates to Php 18.135 billion as per April 23, 2026 exchange rate.

That limitation, which is even lesser than the budget provided to the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the current and the two previous enacted General Appropriations Act, means that the Armed Forces of the Philippines will probably be stuck into getting the more ‘cost effective’ option in improving its capabilities. This means limiting into securing additional FA-50PH lead-in fighter trainer jets, Sabrah light tanks or their equivalent, and Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigates.

ENDING NOTE

Infrastructure support is as important as the military hardware purchased.
Image from the 5th Fighter Wing, Philippine Air Force.

The Philippine defense budget for the year 2026 is indeed higher compared to the previous years that the national government set aside for key big ticket acquisition projects needed for the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ various service branches, although the actual requirements provided in each horizon of the Revised AFP Modernization Program are still not met given that the allotments available is still not sufficient for this endeavor.

This comes as the un-programmed appropriations of the Philippine defense budget under the 2026 General Appropriations Act for the Revised AFP Modernization Program come higher than the one allotted for the programmed appropriations, with the former having more than half of the allotments intended for the purchase of intended big-ticket, military hardware-oriented projects that each of the service branches have in mind, in line with the Horizon 3 phase and the previous Horizon 1 and 2 lineups.

Added to this is the provision that welcomes soft loans and similar-crafted financing schemes related to credit lines and flexible payment arrangements, although this still needs adhering to the provisions stipulated in the Presidential Decree No. 415, especially in the ceiling it provides for the Secretary of National Defense in authorizing as to the extent of the amount allowable for multiple acquisition projects to push through. This put key projects with comprehensive packages like the multirole fighter jets in a dilemma.

Aside from the key problems presented on both the budgetary allotment and the financing schemes, one another area not discussed on is on the investment needed for the supporting infrastructure that allows the Philippine Armed Forces to accommodate and properly maintain its expensive military hardware, let alone expand the welfare of its personnel as part of a necessary policy direction governed by a proper process as specified using the DOTMLPF-P analysis.

Ultimately, the 2026 Philippine defense budget presents two different yet justifiable perspectives relative to the overall efforts needed to push for a professional and highly capable Philippine Armed Forces. 

On one hand, they received the largest share for their modernization efforts compared to the previous year's figures, while on the other hand, it presents that the budget, while commendable, is still insufficient. 

Ultimately, it is a clear indicator that investing to ensure this country’s freedom always comes at a cost.

To access the documents, here are the following links below.

1. GAA 2026 - Department of National Defense Budget, under Volume I-A, Chapter XXI (archived).

2. GAA 2026  Revised AFP Modernization Program Budget, under Volume I-B, Chapter XLII (archived).

3. GAA 2026 Un-programmed Appropriations, under Volume I-B, Chapter XLIII (archived).

(c) 2026 PDA.

Published from a station in Eastern Visayas. 

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Philippine Navy's Additional Anti-Submarine Helicopter Procurement

As the Philippine Navy increases the number of ships in its fleet, followed by the successful awarding of the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement for the construction and delivery of two (2) additional Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigates by HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, adding more anti-submarine helicopters into the fleet comes as a follow-on to this development relating to the service branch's ongoing fleet expansion.

AT A GLANCE

A single AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopter of the Philippine Navy on display.
Image Source.

Through the end of the year 2025, the service branches under the Armed Forces of the Philippines are securing one project after the other, especially with the Philippine Navy securing most of its fleet expansion and capability building programs as highlighted in the Procurement Monitoring Report issued by the Department of National Defense encompassing the second half of the said year. We already discussed one project as covered in this monitoring report, involving the purchase of two additional frigates.

Another project of the Philippine Navy covered in the procurement monitoring report covers the purchase of additional Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Helicopters for the Philippine Navy, whereby it secured both the contract and the notice to proceed documents on December 29, 2025, just days before the calendar year ends. The pre-procurement conference took place on September 30, 2025, with Negotiated Procurement being the mode of acquisition as prescribed in Republic Act 12009.

The deal, which comes through an items-based form of procurement, will probably come with the Philippine Navy dealing with the Italian defense manufacturer Leonardo, involving the production and delivery of at least six (6) AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopters for the service branch's Naval Air Warfare Force unit or NAWF. 

Currently, the unit maintains and operates at least two (2) AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopters, typically in tandem with the Jose Rizal-class guided-missile frigates currently in service.

Amounting to Php 42.290 billion at its contract price, this is one of the most expensive acquisition project that the Philippine Navy has undertaken at the time this article gets published, at par to the contract price for two (2) additional HDF-3200/Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigate under the Frigate Acquisition Program - Full Complement, which has a contract price of Php 42.195 billion. This increases the number of AW-159 Wildcats in Philippine Navy service to at least eight (8) units.

In this discussion, the details will delve less on the platform itself, as this was covered in a previous article on this website published in 2019, referring to the two first units already serving the service branch ever since. Instead, the details will cover the lineup of current and future naval warships for the six (6) AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopters that might get assigned into, along with the anti-submarine capabilities that came with the units ordered by the service branch.

THE DEAL WITH THE ITALIAN DEFENSE SUPPLIER

The AW 109 helicopter currently maintained by the Philippine Air Force.
From Jet Photos.

Since the start of the Revised AFP Modernization Program Horizon Levels in 2013, the Italian defense supplier Leonardo (then Finmeccanica) has provided rotary aerospace support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines as its weaponry requirements becoming more complex and expensive over time, as this is exhibited with the type of helicopter and the number of units that a service branch of the Philippine military has bought through the years through this supplier.

For context, the Philippine Air Force bought at least eight (8) AW 109 helicopters for its air support operations in a contract signed on November 2013, making it as the service branch’s mainstay attack helicopter until the purchase and arrival of the six (6) T-129 ATAK helicopter that they bought from Turkish Aerospace Industries through a contract that was signed in July 2020. The contract price for the Turkish-made attack helicopters amounted to US$269 million or Php 12.9 billion.

With the contract price of Php 3.441 billion during the contract signing in 2013 (Php 5.178 billion as adjusted to inflation), the perspective of the AW 109 helicopters bought by the Philippine Air Force today might count as a minor one compared to the current budgetary requirements for the purchase of six (6) AW 159 Wildcat anti-submarine warfare helicopters, as the latter comes with more complex and more sophisticated sensors and weaponry onboard fitting for anti-submarine operations.

The presented numerical perspective gives an insight into the growth of the relations between Leonardo as the supplier and the Armed Forces of the Philippines through the Philippine Navy as the end-user, although this deal comes at the basis of an inventory-based form of procurement, whereby the aforementioned service branch already has the skills and experience maintaining and operating the AW 159 Wildcat Helicopters, with the aim of just adding the units being the most logical way to go.

As the deal involves the purchase of six (6) units of anti-submarine warfare helicopters meant for the operational requirements of the Naval Air Warfare Force (NAWF) as a support component of the Philippine Navy’s Offshore Combat Force (OCF) and its primary naval combatants deployed at sea, the next point of discussion will delve primarily to the naval vessel composition of the Philippine Navy fleet where these naval helicopters will probably end up getting assigned into, along with its crew.

THE FLEET COMPOSITION AND PROJECTED HELICOPTER ASSIGNMENT

The Miguel Malvar-class guided-missile frigates are among the likely recipients of the new anti-submarine helicopters. 
From Clinton J Down Photography, via Image Source.

The orders made for the additional AW 159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopters always gives correspondence to the tandem of warships that the units are most likely get assigned into, as this completes the capability of the Philippine Navy’s formidable combatant vessels relating to the detection and eliminating any underwater threats that are lurking in areas of concern, specifically on areas of water that are within the country’s archipelagic geography during the times of heightened conflict in a scenario.

For context, the purchase of two (2) AW 159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopters in 2019 goes in tandem to the purchase and construction of two (2) Jose Rizal-class guided missile frigates that have gotten delivered in 2020 and 2021 for both BRP Jose Rizal and BRP Antonio Luna, respectively. 

This means that the purchase of both the ship and the helicopter forms a comprehensive anti-submarine warfare package for the Philippine Navy that applies to the purchase of six (6) additional anti-submarine helicopters of the type.

In this current setup, two (2) units out of six (6) units ordered will go to the newly commissioned guided missile frigates of the Philippine Navy from 2025, namely the ships BRP Miguel Malvar and BRP Diego Silang, respectively. The other two (2) units will go to the pair of ships produced under the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement Program, which are basically a repeat order of the Miguel Malvar-class frigates already in service with the fleet, increasing the number of such ships in the class to four (4) vessels.

This leaves the remaining two (2) units ordered under this program for anti-submarine warfare helicopters, whereby it will go as intended by the end-user, either as a land-based anti-submarine platform or as a complementary one for the likely second batch of vessels under a new iteration of the Corvette Acquisition Project - similar to the one that the Philippine Navy did for the Frigate Full Complement Program that are now under construction in HD Hyundai shipyard at the time of this writing.

Upon completion, eight (8) anti-submarine warfare helicopters will form part of the Philippine Navy’s added capabilities in conjunction to the guided missile frigates already in service, plus two (2) more vessels should the service branch pursue it, whereby it adds the coverage into the territorial and exclusive economic zone waters of the country against threats that are lurking beneath the surface, where it will surely disrupt the country’s economic activity at the time of conflict.

KNOWING THE THALES UNDERWATER FLASH DIPPING SONAR

Dipping sonar systems play a crucial role in an anti-submarine helicopter's capability.
Image Source.

One crucial capability of an anti-submarine helicopter that was not previously discussed on previous articles made relating to this topic involves an essential detection feature that not only helps detect a submarine at a glance but also helps triangulate the detection of submarines, enabling both the helicopter pilots and crew onboard a surface combatant warship to close coordinate for eliminating the target from threatening the national interest of an archipelagic country, especially if it took place within territorial waters.

This essential capability refers to the anti-submarine helicopter’s own flash-dipping sonar, whereby it plays a crucial role in detecting submarines that is complementary to a warship’s hull-mounted and towed array sonar systems installed onboard. 

The said feature enables the navy to detect submarines without having much risk of retaliating back, as employing active sonar system features to detect submarines also reveals the location of the ping’s origin, making an unprepared vessel vulnerable to counterattack.

For the Leonardo AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopters that the Philippine Navy currently has, plus the additional units already on order, such capability comes through the Thales Underwater Flash Dipping Sonar, which comes from the supplier that provides the CAPTAS family of towed array sonars that have offered to the service branch for its surface combatants belonging to the Offshore Combat Force as shown in a demonstration during the 2024 Asian Defense and Security (ADAS) Exhibition in the country.

The Thales Underwater Flash Dipping Sonar comes with its own capabilities, one of which is already given among dipping sonar systems, which is to minimize exposure while hunting a submarine. 

Its capabilities also come with optimization regarding the automation of its deployment and recovery, giving added agility to the anti-submarine helicopter’s performance during demanding operations, aside from having an optimization of its detection by having a 750-meter maximum depth deployment. 

Already operated by eighteen (18) navies worldwide, including the Philippine Navy, the dipped sonar system provided by Thales for the AW159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopters help complete the performance needed for these units as intended for its original design elements, as this gives an essential tool for the service branch’s Offshore Combat Force personnel to conduct operations that deter underwater threats that put risk both on security and maritime logistics lifeline of the country.

ENDING NOTE

The AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopter will be the Philippine Navy's mainstay ASW helicopter platform.
Image Source.

The purchase of six (6) additional anti-submarine warfare helicopters for the Philippine Navy provides a significant benefit not only in expanding the capabilities of the service branch’s Naval Air Warfare Force in deterring underwater threats, but also gives expanded detection coverage of the country’s continental shelf domain, as it is the duty for an archipelagic country like the Philippines to ensure the safety and security of the country’s maritime-related national interest.

This also presents an opportunity for the supplier, like Leonardo, to expand its share in the Philippine defense market, adding up to the portfolio of products successfully sold to the Armed Forces of the Philippines that are still in operation at the time this article has been written. 

Aside from the expanded market share, this also gives expanded benefits for a streamlined supply chain for spare parts support for the helicopter’s upkeep, as sharing a similar type provides smooth logistics and learning skills on its operations.

To add further, the additional AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopter presents itself as a continuous investment of both the Department of National Defense and the Philippine Navy in its expanded capabilities under the Revised AFP Modernization Program as enacted under the Republic Act 10349, as this comes in tandem with the ongoing and future fleet expansion projects of the service branch. The Miguel Malvar-class guided-missile frigates are among the recipients of this development.

With the ongoing purchase of additional frigates under the Frigate Acquisition Project - full complement and the likely plans for the future purchase of corvettes, the numbers presented for additional AW-159 Wildcat anti-submarine helicopter orders give sense, as its designed role in the fleet usually goes complementary to the ship it gets assigned into, especially with the ship’s onboard sensors and weapons suite also comes with hunting underwater threats like submarines in mind.

On its entirety, the Philippine Navy’s additional anti-submarine warfare capabilities presents an opportunity for the fleet to increase its capabilities on this specialized field, coming alongside its proposals relating to the purchase of its own submarines that gives added symmetry to the warfare dynamics that intertwine the country’s geography to its aspirations for a comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness. This forms part of an external defense posture that is not limited to just weapons and arms purchases.

(c) 2026 PDA.

Published from a station in Eastern Visayas. 

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Frigate Full Complement Project - Additional Miguel Malvar-class FFG

After the outstanding success of the two Miguel Malvar-class frigates delivered under the Corvette Acquisition Project, the Philippine Navy now embarks on another acquisition program, which now calls for the purchase of two (2) additional frigates under the project entitled 'Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement'.

As the project becomes clear that its direction aims on basically a repeat order of a naval asset already in service within the Philippine Navy fleet, this discussion aims primarily to this acquisition program where different designs got presented as usual, until the contract signing and confirmation that gives an affirmative on what is ideally be the increase of number of ships belonging to the same class of vessels in service.

OVERVIEW - THE CONTRACT HAS JUST SIGNED

The BRP Miguel Malvar (FFG06), mooring at port during the commissioning ceremony.
Image (c) Philippine Navy

In the final days of the year 2025, specifically on the day of December 26, the Department of National Defense signed a contract with HD Hyundai Heavy Industries for the purchase of two (2) additional frigates under the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement Program, which come as an ongoing defense partnership between the DND and the said South Korean shipbuilder, now totalling at least twelve (12) ships ordered under this arrangement.

The frigate mentioned in this deal involves the production and delivery of two (2) frigates based on the HDF-3200 design, from which the Miguel Malvar-class frigates currently serving in the Philippine Navy, derives from. 

With the mention of the design at hand, it gives a clear signal that the service branch now likely aims to streamline its fleet of ships, as this inventory-based item of a purchase will come likely as a repeat order of the Miguel Malvar-class frigate, with it having its own set of subcomponent upgrades.

The update regarding the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement’s procurement phase reflects on the Procurement Monitoring Report released by the Department of National Defense for the second half of 2025, showing that the department’s bids and awards committee took only five (5) months from pre-bid conference into the contract signing and issuing the notice to proceed document, easing the materialization of documents for the production to start.

Adding to this is that choosing a proven design and the one already serving within the Philippine Navy will surely lessen the time required to undertake the needed Critical Design Review, in which will give shorter time between the notice to proceed issuance to the delivery of ships to the Philippine Navy fleet. 

The move will also increase the number of Miguel Malvar-class frigates to at least four (4) vessels, with more likely to come , depending on the discretion of the leadership.

In this writeup, it will only delve on the primary key details relating to the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement, on the other designs considered before settling into getting the additional Miguel Malvar-class frigate, the subsystems that will probably find its way on the new ships that are currently absent on the warships currently serving in the fleet, and other relevant details that will give a full scope encompassing this key topic under the Philippine Navy’s capability upgrade efforts.

THE FRIGATE ACQUISITION PROJECT - FULL COMPLEMENT PROGRAM

The eyes initially looked at this HDF-3500 frigate design, until the Procurement Monitoring Report confirmed that it is an item-based approach, suggesting a repeat order of the Miguel Malvar-class.
File image from ADAS 2024.

This program presented itself as the second iteration of the Frigate Acquisition Project as part of the Philippine Navy’s ongoing modernization efforts, amounting to Php 34 billion in contract price for Lot 1, encompassing the delivery of at least a pair of guided missile frigates complete with armaments onboard (hence, the full complement description), while a separate lot is for the delivery of the ship’s onboard munitions, ranging from missiles to the ammunition of the 76mm main gun and the Close-In Weapons System.

Before the awarding of the contract to HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, the design preferences for this acquisition project of the Philippine Navy narrowed down to only two (2) designs, both of which were presented by the South Korean shipbuilder during the 2024 Asian Defense And Security (ADAS) Exhibition. 

The designs mentioned refer to both the HDF-3200 frigate design that became the Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigate, and the larger, 129-meter HDF-3500 frigate design.

As expected, the initial prospects went to the larger HDF-3500 design, of which it sports a larger hull, a bridge design similar to the Rajah Sulayman-class Offshore Patrol Vessels, a superstructure portion that linked the bridge to the exhaust funnel, and a similar design and subsystems principle found onboard the Miguel Malvar-class frigate with the 76mm Oto Melara Super Rapid Gun, 16-cell Vertical Launch System, a GOKDENIZ CIWS, 8-cannister C-Star anti-ship missiles, and two (2) triple-tubed torpedo launchers.

Since it is more of an item-based procurement, the awarding of the project to HD Hyundai Heavy Industries will probably be a repeat order of the Miguel Malvar-class frigate, which means the design will stick to the all-familiar HDF-3200 frigate design. 

This means that there is a lesser need for a critical design review, and a delivery date before the year 2028 will be achievable, provided that the queue for the remaining Rajah Sulayman-class OPVs gets cleared for the frigate construction to start.

With the prospects for a four (4) unit Miguel Malvar-class frigate for the Philippine Navy, the next case for this discussion will probably dwell on the current fleet configuration of the Philippine fleet’s Offshore Combat Force or OCF, as it already has four (4) frigates already serving the fleet as of this time the article gets published, composing of two (2) Jose Rizal-class frigates, and the two (2) Miguel Malvar-class frigates that have joined the fleet recently.

THE FLEET COMPOSITION AND THE NAVY SAIL PLAN

Here is one of multiple iterations of the Philippine Navy's Sail Plan, of which this one calls for the fleet to get at least six (6) frigates.
Image from the Philippine Fleet.

In the original Philippine Navy desired force mix that was presented in the early 2010s when the Revised AFP Modernization Program was a newly enacted law, the fleet calls for at least six (6) frigates for its operational requirements, of which it originally aims for anti-air warfare capabilities. The same sail plan calls for at least twelve (12) corvettes that specialize more on anti-submarine warfare, creating a distinction of roles between the two types of vessels in the fleet.

From this point of view, this will mean that the frigate acquisition project - full complement will be the final one, as the Jose Rizal-class frigate and the first pair of Miguel Malvar-class frigate already in service, with the pair of Miguel Malvar-class repeat orders under the said acquisition project completing the minimum six (6) frigate requirements. 

That, of course, might still depend on the leadership’s discretion, as reclassifying the Jose Rizal-class to corvettes might mean another room for 2 more frigates to purchase.

In this hypothetical scenario, if the Jose Rizal-class frigates got reclassified as corvettes, then it gives the impetus for the purchase of two (2) additional frigates, likely another repeat order of the Miguel Malvar-class frigate, to satisfy the six (6) frigates that the desired force mix calls for. But this hypothetical scenario only applies if the desired force mix is still the one that the Philippine Navy follows,‌ which changes are already taking place since its first iteration in the early 2010s.

Ultimately, hypothetically securing at least six (6) Miguel Malvar-class frigates or another repeat order after the current procurement of two (2) frigates from this class will adhere to the rule of three (3) arrangement for ship deployment cycles, whereby one ship undertakes maintenance schedules and routine subcomponent upgrades, the second ship conducting actual naval operations underway, and the third ship on standby, ready for deployment at a moment’s notice, all ensuring the combat readiness of the naval force.

As the Miguel Malvar-class frigate might likely end up increased to four (4) ships operating by the Philippine Navy following the repeat order, a procurement for another batch of two (2) warships of this class won’t be that bad for the leadership planning to consider, as it gives optimization for the operation of the frigates for deployment, balancing its time on undertaking maintenance downtimes and on its actual at-sea operation requirements.

THE ‘FULL COMPLEMENT’ DESCRIPTION

Thales offered the CAPTAS-1 Variable Depth Sonar to the Philippine Navy.
(c) Thales, via Naval News.

One thing noticeable in this second batch iteration of the frigate acquisition project is its added description for ‘full complement’, which is an impression that this project will come with complete subsystems onboard, something that is absent on both the first frigate acquisition project that came the Jose Rizal-class guided missile frigate (FF), and the corvette acquisition project that eventually get reclassified into what is now the Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigates (FFG).

The first thing that comes into mind in discussing the ‘full complement’ part of purchasing two (2) additional guided missile frigates for the Philippine Navy to use is on the towed array sonar inclusion into the ship’s construction, of which it initially comes absent from the purchase of Miguel Malvar-class frigate of the Philippine Navy and counts as a separate purchase under the ‘fitted for, but not with’ or FFBNW scheme. This project now has this subcomponent as part of the package.

There are multiple towed array sonar solutions that the second batch of Miguel Malvar-class frigates might take, of which there are still no final details on the specific sonar solutions for consideration. One potential candidate for a sonar solution will be the Thales CAPTAS family of sonars, specifically the CAPTAS-2 sonar variant. The cheaper CAPTAS-1 sonar variant that Thales offered to the Philippine Navy during the Asian Defense and Security Exhibition (ADAS) 2024 will also count as a preferable candidate.

While there are no certain specific solutions for the frigate acquisition project - full complement’s towed array sonar system, its inclusion already gives a boost to the capabilities of these repeat order of the Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigates, so much that they may get the first two (2) ships of the class already in service in the Philippine Navy undertake its first repair/maintenance schedule to receive a similar system for commonality on capabilities.

Ultimately, the capabilities that will probably be found on the full complement version of the Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigate will probably find their way to the first two ships of the class, effectively making the batch 2 procurement of the additional guided missile frigate a primary basis on improving the capabilities of existing ones in the fleet. This effectively gives both commonality and expanded fleet size, which might serve as a reference for future repeat orders, especially if they are to be pursued. 

IN SUMMARY

BRP Miguel Malvar moored at port.
File Image.

The Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement Program of the Philippine Navy incorporates previously absent subsystems that counted as ‘Fitted For, But Not With’ into the new ships, which then will count as a fully packaged guided missile frigates with new subsystems that might get its way onboard will eventually trickle to the other active vessels on the fleet, expanding the capabilities on the broader ecosystem provided by the service branch’s Offshore Combat Force.

On the area of warship design, the decision of sticking to the HDF-3200 frigate variant that the Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigates are based on makes it ideal for the Philippine Navy’s delivery prospects, particularly in the sense that significant time for a critical design review gets reduced as they choose a design already approved previously for end-user requirements. This will hasten the time needed for the construction of the ships and eventually their introduction into the fleet.

Aside from faster construction and delivery date, the decision of having the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement based on the HDF-3200/Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigate design also helps the Philippine Navy streamline its commonality and logistical chain in training, operating, maintaining, and sourcing spare parts for the upkeep of the vessels, as keeping similar design features helps identify the areas for troubleshooting and improvements better.

With the current numbers now increased to at least four (4) frigates of the type, it will not be surprising if the Philippine Navy pursues more of this proven ship design for its expanded fleet of surface combatants that form the Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigate, as it gives the effectivity of it being the backbone of the fleet’s offshore combat force capabilities, especially as part of a naval force that augments the security of the country’s national territory as the current focus of the Philippine Armed Forces.

Ultimately, this might help the fleet improve and secure a formidable naval force that secures the country’s territorial and exclusive economic zone waters, befitting for an archipelagic country surrounded by multiple bodies of water that it serves as a vital lifeblood of the entire nation, from providing food security to its citizenry through the vast marine resources it contains through shipping lanes that drives economic growth and development. 

All of which gives importance to the role of a formidable navy in securing the country’s survival.

(c) 2026 PDA.

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